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Wage Policy and Employment in a Developing Economy 
by 
John R. Harris and Michael P. lodaro 
In their quest for the combined objectives of rapid 
industrial growth and significant labour absorption, the majority 
of less developed countries have made more progress towards 
growth objectives than towards employment* Commonly, these 
countries have experienced acceptable growth rates of industrial 
output accompanied by high rates of labour productivity growth. 
As a result, industrial employment has lagged significantly 
behind output growth. Moreover, a somewhat unexpected pheno-
menon, widespread and growing urban unemployment, has not only 
complicated matters of economic planning but, more importantly, 
has emerged as the most pressing socio-political problem facing 
many of these developing nations, especially the newly independent 
ones of tropical Africa. 
In retrospect, it now appears clear that those economists 
and planners who believed that the answer to the problem of 
urban labour absorption was simply to generate high rates of 
industrial growth were mistaken. What in fact has happened is 
that higher levels of eut^ cct growth, hafe been accompanied by 
proportionally high levels of labour productivity growth. For 
example, Table I provides some cross-sectional data on relative 
rates of output and labour productivity growth (the difference, 
of course, being employment growth) in the manufacturing sector 
of a number of developing economies during the 1950's. 
Table I 
Relative Growth Rates of Manufacturing Output and 
Labour Productivity in Selected Less Developed 
Economies, 1950-1960* (Annual Rates) 
Output Labour Productivity 
Argentina 4,4 6.6 Brazil 9,8 7.2 
Chile 5,4 3-7 Colombia 7.6 5.1 Venezuela 13.0 11.9 Mexico 6.5 6.1 Greece 8.9 6. 9 India 6.8 3.5 
Kenya 7.6 8.7 Zambia 10.5 9.0 
*Por Kenya the period covered is 1954-641 Por Zambia, 
it is 195 6-63-
Sources; Por Latin America and India; Wr Baer and M. Hervei "Employment and Industrials ".in at ion in Developing'Countries, " 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Pebe1966, 800 p.91• Por Greece; S,Geronimakis, "Postwar Economic Growth in 
Greece, 1950-61," cited in Bo Higgins, Economic Development. 
New York 1968, p.769. Por Kenya; Republic of Kenya, 
Development Plan 1966-70. Nairobi 1966, p.27 and 251. 
Por Zambia; Census of Production in 1963 Lusaka 1965, 
Table 3« 
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It is apparent he table that for any given increase in 
output growth, employment appears to expand at a disproportio-
nately slower rate. lor example, in a recent United Nations 
study of less developed nations it was found that a two percent 
increase in the rate of manufacturing output growth in general 
will be associated with somewhat less than a one percent rise in 
the rate of employment growth.^ 
The fundamental question that remains, however, concerns 
the causes as well as the sources of the observed rapid increases 
in labour productivity. Numerous analytical arguments have been 
expounded. At one extreme there are those who would argue simply 
along lines of "technological determinism", that is, that 
industrial growth by definition necessitates the importation of 
the most modern vintage of labour saving capital equipment. More 
importantly, it is argued occasionally that this process neces-
sarily will go on regardless of the level of relative factor 
prices due to the "physical dominance" of modern technologies 
in certain industries. Since these technologies become 
progressively more capital intensive over time, it follows that 
labour productivety will rise continuously while employment will 
lag behind. At the other extreme, there are those who argue 
that the rise in labour productivity has little or nothing to 
do with "capital deepening" or "capital modernizing". Rather, 
they claim that it is due largely to skill upgrading through the 
natural process of "learning by doing" as an essentially migratory 
labour force is transformed over time into a more stable, factory 
and machine-oriented labour force and to public and private 
programs designed deliberately to educate and train unskilled 
labour. In the "jargon" of modern economic theory, rising labour 
productivity is attributable to the phenomenon of "labour 
augmenting technological progress". Finally, some would claim 
that improved managerial organisation lies at the heart of rising 
labour productivity while others argue that the existence of 
increasing returns to scale in a number of large industries 
accounts for the productivity phenomenon. 
With the exception of the physical dominance argument where 
the problem does not arise,^ the literature on economic deve-
lopment is not at all clear whether or not these sources of 
1/ United Nations, The G-rowth of World Industry 1936-1961; Inter-
national Analysis and Tables. New York, 196o, pp.bl and H5 
^ Undoubtedly in some very large scale industries, (e.g.petroleum 
refining, petrochemicals, perhaps steel making) the existence of 
physical dominance is a real possibility. In the great majority 
of light and medium industries, however, the potential range of 
efficient technical choice is significant. Actual choice in 
these cases should depend largely on existing and expected 
movements in factor prices. 
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labour productivity growth are independent of relative factor 
prices and, in particular, the prevailing and anticipated 
future level of industrial real wage rates. Although the 
theory of induced innovation recognizes the impact of factor 
price expectations on the speed and bias of technological 
progress, what little empirical work has been done on this 
question has been directed exclusively to the advanced economies.^ 
But it is in less developed economies where some of the largest 
rises in labour productivity have been observed and where the 
employment problem is most acute. Therefore, we feel it important 
to shed some additional light on the empirical relationship 
between wages, productivity and employment in a developing 
economy not only for the explanatory value of such an exercise, 
but, more importantly, for the policy implications that can 
emerge from the analysis. 
In this paper we shall present evidence from Kenya suggesting 
that labour productivity growth (and, thus, employment growth) 
is in fact functionally related to the level and growth of 
industrial real wages. By looking separately at the empirical 
relationship between productivity growth and wage growth for 
the three major racial groups in Kenya (European, Asian, and 
African) we are provided with a unique opportunity to examine 
the impact of v/age changes on the demand for different skill 
catagories of labour since in Kenya the Europeans are the dominant 
managerial class while Asians and Africans in general comprise 
the skilled and unskilled catagories respectively. Our basic 
argument will be that for the unskilled African labourer the 
level and growth of industrial employment (and indirectly, 
urban unemployment) is largely determined by the level and 
expected growth of industrial real wage rates. M0reover, on 
the basis of our findings vte shall argue that Kenya and other 
developing nations in a similar situation are faced with a 
fundamental political as well as economic choice as to whether 
they prefer to have a high productivity, high wage, elite 
industrial labour force with considerable urban unemployment 
or a lower productivity, lower wage but considerably larger 
industrial labour force with relatively low levels of urban 
unemployment. 
•^See, for example, William Fellner, "Does the Market Direct the 
Relative Pactor-Saving Effects of Technical Progress?" in 
Nat. Bur. Econ. Research, The Rate and Direction of Incentive 
Activity; Economic and Social Factors, Princeton 1962, pp.171-188 
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Data and Regression Results 
Kenya provides a good example of output expansion 
accompanied by an actual fall in recorded employment between 
1955 and 1962. Table 2 presents data on output and employment 
of Africans, Asians, and Europeans in the private sector in 
Kenya for the years 1955-66. There was a change in coverage 
between 1963 and 1964, hence the series are comparable only for 
the sub-periods 1955-63 and 63-66. 
The rapid rise in average productivity of labour of each 
racial group during the period is marked. At the same time 
average wages were rising. Table 3 presents our calculations 
of average wage for each of the groups during the period. 
In the Table 4 we show the annual percentage changes in 
output, value added per worker and average wage for each of the 
groups. 
Even a casual clance at Table 4 suggests that there is a 
strong positive relationship between changes in value added per 
worker (average productivity of labour) and changes in average 
wages. To get a more precise idea of the relationships we have 
calculated simple linear regressions (fitted by the ordinary 
least squares technique) between changes in value added per 
* 
employee (denoted P which is percentage change in "productivity") 
and average wages (denoted W which is percentage change in wage) 
for each of the groups. The results are as follows: 
African Workers 
(1) P = 1.78 + .761 W , R2 =• .703 
(1.60) (.17) 
Asian Workers 
(2) P = 3.09 + .322 W , R2 = .15 
(1.43) (.28) 
European Workers 
+ 1.05 1 
(2.95) (.47) 
(3) P = .41  W , R2 = .38 
where the figures in parentheses are the standard errors of 
estimate of the coefficients. Scatter diagrams with the fitted 
regression lines are shown in Pigures 1-3. 
VJl" -f*- OJ 
a o p p 
H o £ 
H O £ H H 
P p cf c+ 
CD CD 
p , p , 
O P H o £ 
H P c+ 
CD P 
H H H 
CJt IV) 
-J CJi VJl 4^ u> IV) H 
—' ' — ' ' — 
bd > < > <! O hd < ! 
a a 02 hcj h> O W 
W td w H b kri w b W S H 
o a o fe a fe H Cd H g < j a 
h j bd td o bd a bd t o bd 
SJ bd , V ^ — W 1-3 
o t » > - • f ") bd > - bd - s i o bd 
c+ tzi b o fc* •ts S td O g o bd td 
IV) H CD u o ^ - h d td O hi — g td O K H H U o CQ H bd O bd b4 bd O tH S bd o m ^ bd 
g ti 
. . ^ J — H—1 O U hd U — ^ hd a w 03 02 c f hd IT) t n tH a 
O O O t n hd tr i 9 hd ra O hd o 0 2 - — £ £ O bd O bd bd bd k! bd 1-3 f«5 
4 4 H3 K W 02 bd W bd w w 
o O p fed bd l\2 bd bd CD cd o" bd bd Oo 02 
0 0 . . H VJl 02 IV) tE> H CD IV) b t d 
02 W U t d 
c+ cd ro H P o 
c+ £ H-CQ H 
c+ H -
H - o 
O P o oo U J VJl H 
H Hb H NO IV) VJl CD 
H O CT\ UJ 00 - J CT\ — 
> PS o o\ • » • VJl 
CT CD IV) cn o L>~> VJl 
03 ts 
c+ 
p Oo UJ VJl H P NO H NO IV) - J VJl VD O CT\ O — J 00 H — 
c+ 02 VD a VD O • o VJl 
CT VJl VJl CJi - J U J Oo c\ 
x—s P H c+ 
VD H - 00 Oo CTi H H 
C^ CQ •o H rv> VJl O 
VJl c+ 00 H oo VJl H O VJl 
NO H - H VD • • • -J 
O O oo CO VJl 
h3 P P H 
c^ oo H H 
H > - O H NO IV) - a O — CD H o IV) VO O VJl 
H 
CQ o\ • VJl • « e oo 
c+ -P* o oo oo VJl 
O P P o CO — j H H v—^  c+ NO H IV) o 4^ O — 
-o VD IV) rv> VJl CT\ OO VJl 
£ Oo o — j o O • VD P H O o o H o - J vd 
CT\ H VJl 00 - J H H 
VD N* N9 H NO IV) VJl H -CJi VD f J VJl H H O cr, -J H3 —J H « • • o 
p c\ OJ U J CJi H 
a" 
1-3 H P CD VD oo H I—1 
C71 so H NO IV) IV) O J H — H \ H VJl - J H 
CD p H 00 • • • O H H P IV) o O o H H 
P J oo H P H P H o 00 H H v—' VD NO H IV) Oo H — 
cn O 00 U J Oo IV) C7\ 
•O • o • O • r o 
O o\ o VJl IV) CO 
1-3 P H 
CT* H VD H H H V I H >» IV) OO IV) H -CD - a O VD o H VD Ch CD o • H 9 V • Co o IV) O O J CO IV) 
VD P H P VJl O0 H H P ^ H NO IV) VJl Ch 4^ — P H O H 00 VJl VD OA 
O0 • H « • • Oo 0s! IV) OJ Lo IV) —0 
00 P H 
VJl VD H H 
• NO IV) IV) cn VJl — H VD CTi -J O VD vn Ch 
VD O UJ • O • VJl 
Oo Ch 4^ CT\ o VJl 
H -J VJl VD H H 
NO ro OO — J — 00 VD CO VD O VD 
VJl o VJl • • • cn o VJl o O OO 
8 
1-3 
>-d a 1-9 
u 
bd 
tH O 
5 ^ 1-3 
H « 
bd 
£ 
H VD VJl VJl I 
ch 
"-d W H <! 
t» 
H3 
bd 
H 
U a 
02 
H3 w K 
td 
o O 
t=j 
t=5 M w o 
bd 
t d 
bd 
iv> 
[V) H 
IV) 
> s? CQ H H- 4 o P H-ti O CD P P B £ 
W 
M H p o v •5 ^ H H o O CD CQ CD CO CD CD CQ 
ra f» | < I CD 4 P 3*3 t—1 CD 
NO ch o 4^  CC - ^ H H vn P VD o VJI JQ 0 H 
\s —J hd O 4==- OJ - P UJ • H-CO UJ cn pj 
H 
vo oc hd H 4^  o - 4 O » VJI H-
CT\ VJ1 -J <1 P H cf 
Vd 0C CD H 4^  IV) -
© ' vn H [V) UD Co P 
& H s £ CC & CD H 4^  o — p^  c r vn VJ1 9 4 o 4^  vn VD =< 
H ffi 
-O p 
H 4^  rv> & 
- J U 1 • CK UD - J o o O O 
H H n 
•<• O — CD IV) UJ cn 4 cr\ C^  • H o vn O VJl CD 
•NO 
H H M H — CD Lu O a\ P ro O0 © ro H vn O P 
H VO H H 
V> UJ — U1 vn IV) Ch l ro H • U J . CT\ (V> o cr\ 
* 
H H ro — Ul U> 00 IV) c o UJ O 
H H 
NO — a CTi cr> • —J VJI 
H H 
NO —J a O^  ro o Ch 
W -J o 
—J cn ui 4^  Lo ro H 
— - — ' 
H t» M <J •c. J2> <j > > <1 <1 s ^  P P CQ < CQ P K> <i Hj P P t1" 4 CD 4 H H- CD H- H 4 CD 4 H H P 
* o 4 O p P 4 P P H- 4 H- P P P C^  O Ti P W CD P P P CD Q p O CD CD P CD P CD QtJ ro 0*3 P 0*3 p P O H P CD P P W CD fc£ P p ro P P P H p O P P p. P P P P P P P P lri P H =si i?d P P hj CO H t*l P t?d CD H P H CD 0 P P CD CD CD CD P p 0*3 P P O 0*3 O pj 0*3 ts p P^  4 c+ c^i CD <t5 << CD H CD H o O CD H- CD "> CD >d O O ro hb P O O CD CD CD CD <kj CD P «< 4 4 ro CD 4 c+ c+ 1-b CD CD ro CD p CD CD CQ 3*2 CD O CQ CD _ e cr1 Ul hd O 4 1-3 ro cn H CO ui VJl Ul 4 P1 CD p • • • • 9 9 I H-P P tf CO CO Lu O -J oo CO Ul < 4 f*r H c^  P 3*3 CD cf ro H- CD CD CQ P Ul ro H H Ch H H-c+ ui H Uj ui 00 H O 1 P P p1 p o « • • 9 • A Ul P-CD P •p* O rv> VD H o -J P <1 CQ P 
CT^ c+ H P UJ 1 Ul 4 P CQ • H H UJ -P* o ^ CD H- • » a • 9 9 9 1 O CO CO u» H o 00 o Ul P > CO P P CQ O ^ Pi CD c+ CD 4 CD Ul O P H- o O o ui U1 CO o vo CD c+ 9 * • • 9 « 9 I g CQ tr CO UJ H H Ul p <! ° p CD P 
c f 4 H 
o P P Ul ro CD O ro IV) O H c n Oo v n VD 
• • • a •o 9 • 1 H-> 
O CO 00 - J o c n VJl CA P Pi P o P H « ro o CD Pi P H H en P H -J Ul o [V ro OJ o o ^ hd P • e 8 • « 9 9 1 P ro <rf- UJ cn -J VD Ul H Ul <T\ 4 H- H O ^ P o H cn 4 H- 4^  IV) Ul CO CTl ro H H CQ c * • 9 9 9 • ! CD (V) H UJ Lo Ch 4 B IV P P P CD H ro H CT\ P —J O IV) o VJl Ul IV Pi HJ 9 • • • 9 • • 1 O Cn o o UJ o —J —J cn > 4 OJ < CD |_j H vd • j P Cn 3*3 UJ H H H cn CD 
I -J CO o ro -J —J cn « • 9 • 9 9 • 1 ^ -J H IV <J\ CT\ Ul cn P Ul Tq CD 
H H H en H O O Uj CT\ cn VD Ul 
• 9 9 0 • 9 9 1 CTi (V) Cn CO VD Ul H cn 
CT\ 
- 8 -
(Figure 1) 
(Figure 2) 
Asian Employees Private Industry and Commerce Annual 
Changes 1956-63; 65-60 
-9 -(Figure 3) 
European Employees Private Industry and Commerce. 
Annual Changes 1956-63; 65-66 
(Eigure 4) 
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However, before examining these particular results, it is 
necessary to be certain what the regression variables and 
equations signify. Since changes in average productivity are 
approximately equal to the difference between changes in output « O 9 
and employment ( Y - E gP where Y is output, E is employment 
and the dots denote percentage changes), productivity change 
can be interpreted as the additional amount by which employment 
would have increased had there been no productivity change. 
For example, suppose that in a given year output increased by 
10 percent and employment only by 3 percent. Measured productivity 
will have increased by approximately 7 percent and we can say 
that employment would have been approximately 7 percent higher 
had there been no productivity change (employment would also 
have increased by 10 percent in such a case). Therefore, the o 
coefficient of W can be interpreted as a kind of elasticity of 
demand for labour. If wages rise by x percent, employment will 
rise by x times the coefficient percent less than it would have 
otherwise risen. In fact, this measure is exactly equal to the 
conventional static ?/age elasticity of demand for labour in the 
special case of linear homogenous production function. Perhaps 
Figure 4 will make this more clear. 
If relative prices of capital and labour are represented line 
by theyW0W0, an output of Y-^  will be produced by using the 
input combination C. If output is expanded to Y^? the input 
combination will be D. Since we assume in this diagram that 
there are constant returns to scale, measured labour productivity 
will remain unchanged and employment of all inputs will Increase 
propertionally with output. On the other hand, if relative 
factor prices are represented by W-^ W-^ , than E and F will be the 
respective input combinations for outputs Y-^  and Measured 
labour productivity will be higher at E and F than at C and D 
since less labour (and more capital) are used at the former 
points to produce the same outputs. However, labour productivity 
will not change between E and F as long as there are constant 
returns to scale. 
Now our regression equations attempt to measure the 
relationship between wages and labour productivity in a move 
from C to F. In the case of a linear homogeneous production 
function this can be decomposed into either the moves from C to 
E to F or from C to D to F. In either case the moves from C 
to D or from E to F will involve no change in measured labour 
productivity. The moves from 0 to E or from D to F will both 
- 1 2 -
give the same relationship between changes in wages (price of 
capital being assumed to be constant) and change in labour 
productivity which is also equal to change in employxiont. 
• 9 O o C O 
(Note that P H Y - E. If Y is zero, then P 5-E so that the 
9 O 
regression relation would b e - E = a + b W and the coefficient 
b is the ordinary wage elasticity of demand for labour). We 
might also point out that in general we will obtain an estimate 
of the elasticity of demand for labour from a multiple regression o o o » • • 
of the type P = a + b-jW + Y since by substituting Y - E = P 
and rearranging terms we get - E = a + b-^ W + (bg-l) Y. In tnis 
case b^ is the conventional wage elasticity of demand for 
labour and -^£-1) is the elasticity of employment with respect 
to output which will differ from 1 if there are non-constant 
returns to scale. We intend to run additional regressions in 
this form but have not yet done so because of computational However, 
limitations, /ii'he coefficients b in the regressions we computed 
are unlikely to much affected by the addition of the terms b9Y 9 d. • since Eigure 6 suggests a very weak relationship between P and Y a • 
and Figure 5 suggests little correlation between Y and W for 
African workers. Although we cannot be sure without actually 
calculating the multiple regressions we would be very surprised 
if the b-^  coefficients were to change .much and if the t>2 coeffi-
cients'would-differ significantly from zero. 
Let's look now at our regression results. Equation (1) 
for African., workers shows that some 70 percent of the variation 
in average productivity is explained by variations in wage 
changes (this refers to the R )„ The coefficient of W indicates 
that.if wages rise by x percent, measured productivity will 
rise, by .761spercent. Another way of looking at this relationship 
is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in wages of 10 percent 
would have to be accompanied by output growth of 7.6 percent 
if employment is to'remain constant. 
The constant"term of 1.78 can be interpreted as an annual 
rise-in labour productivity which occurs independently of wage 
changes. It is important to note that this constant is not 
significantly different from ze.'O, r.z-rccT't ~, our data on wages 
and.output have been in current prices. A3 long as both wages 
and output are similarly affected by pricc changes, the coefficient 
a 
of 7/ can be interpreted as a marginal rels-ionship between real 
wages and real output. H0wever, the constant term is not deflated 
and as such reflects price increases in output which would not 
be expected to affect employment along. Luring the period 1955-66 
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there was an average annual rate of inflation of close to two 
percent. Therefore, we reach the somewhat surprising conclusion 
that virtually no real productivity change of African employees 
occured independent of wage changes during this period. 
« 
Furthermore, we know that the estimated coefficient of W 
is a lower bound estimate of the relationship for unskilled 
workers because of Africanization of medium and high, level jobs. 
If high level jobs are Africanized and no change occurs in 
employment or productivity of unskilled African workers, the 
total African employment will rise thereby reducing measured 
African productivity, and the relatively high pay for the 
high-level job increases the average wage which we have measured. 
Therefore our measured productivity is biassed downwards and 
the wage is biassed upwards. As Africanization has been 
increasing over time, the changes in productivity and wages 
o 
wil^.be similarly biased.. The coefficient of W is an estimate 
dP of —v based on the available observations. If measured P is aw 
biassed downwards and W is biassed upwards, it follows that 
out estimate of ^ is biassed downwards also. We can conculde 
therefore, that the elasticity of measured productivity with 
respect to wages is something greater than .761 for unskilled 
and semi-skilled African workers and is not significantly 
different from 1.0 at the p < .05 level. 
It is extremely interesting to note that this result is 
remarkably similar to Reynolds' findings for Puerto Rico. 
Using observations for changes in labour productivity and wage 
changes for 37 industries in the 194-9-54 period and 50 indus-
tries in the period 1954-58, he estimates precisely the same 
simple linear relationship between productivity and wage changes 
and obtains estiiates of the coefficient of wage changes of 
1.137 for 1949-54 and ,939 for 1954-58.4 During this period 
Puerto Rico achieved extremely high rates of industrial growth 
with relatively little growth in employment. "While manufacturing 
output tripled in real terms between 1950 and 1962, factory 
employment rose only 65 percent." Minimum wages were effective 
throughout the period and were raised considerably. It's 
striking to observe the same kind of relationship between wages 
4 L.G-. Reynolds, "Wages and Employment in a labour-Surplus 
Economy," A.E.R., LV (March 1965) p.34. 
5Ibid, p.26 
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and productivity (hence employment) in both Puerto Rico and 
Kenya. While we would hesitate to generalize far beyond theSe 
two cases without further investigation, they certainly suggest 
that substitution of other factors for unskilled labour is 
possible and is responsive to relative factor costs. 
The "true" elasticity of demand for unskilled labour is 
underestimated by both Reynolds and ourselves by our 
inability to take into account the effect of real wage changes 
on investment and output changes. If the wage, elasticity of 
demand for labour is less than ljthe wage cost per unit of 
output will increase with wages. If the elasticity is 1, wage 
costs per unit of output will remain constant but as long as 
lower labour inputs require additional inputs of other factors, 
unit costs will increase with wages. Rising unit costs will make 
exports less competitive, will make import substitution less 
feasible, and will tend to squeeze profit rates. All of these 
effects will cause investment and output to increase less with 
rising real wages than they would increase with constant real 
wages. We have estimated the relationship between wage changes 
and productivity changes and have stated that the coefficient 
o 
of W shows the reduction in employment growth for a given 
output growth attributable to the wage change. If, however, 
a smaller wage change would have given rise to both a lower 
groy/th of productivity and a higher growth of output, then the 
estimated coefficient understates the amount of employment 
lost by wage increases. 
At this point it is necessary to be rather careful in 
delineating alternative hypotheses concerning the causes of 
productivity changes and determining if our regression results 
allow us to distinguish between them. 
Pirst we might consider the hypothesis that changes in 
productivity will occur autonomously over time as new techniques 
are developed, absolutely more efficient capital intensive 
processes are introduced, and organizational improvements occur. 
The constant term in ouir regressions would reflect such 
changes and we have already discussed the fact that it is not 
significantly different from zero. Therefore, we can reject 
the notion of substantial exogenous productivity improvement. 
The second hypotheses to consider is that productivity 
changes occur as a result of output increasing. This can take 
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the form of "learning by doing" or of technical improvements 
being embodied in new equipment. The latter might be tested 
by making investment an explicit independent variable in the 
regression although we would expect investment and output 
changes to be correlated. Finally there is the argument that 
as output increases both existing capital and labour are 
utilized more intensively (increasing labour productivity 
with upswings in the business cycle has been noted in most 
advanced economies). In order to test this hypotheses we 
would have to calculate multiple regressions with output change 
entering as an independent variable along with wage changes. 
We intend to make such a calculation in the near future but 
Figures 5 and 6 give us enough data to tentatively reject the 
quantitative importance of this hypothesis. Furthermore, an 
examination of the scatter diagrams, Figures 1 and 5, suggests 
that wage, productivity, and output changes have not been 
moving together over time (in other words there seems to be 
little serial correlation). If all three changes had been 
increasing together over time we would confound the effects of 
wage changes with autonomous or output-induced productivity 
changes. Therefore, we feel rather confident in concluding 
that there appears to be a significant causal relationship 
between wage changes and productivity changes. 
It is, however, difficult to establish the direction of 
causation on the basis of statistical association. Is it not 
possible that the institutional arrangements are such that 
autonomous or output-induced productivity changes give rise to 
higher wages? One frequently hears statements by both unions 
and government to the effect that wages should reflect productivity 
which might suggest this alternative direction of causation. 
We cannot strictly reject this argument solely on the basis of 
our regressions, but we do favor the original interpretation that 
wage changes are the independent variable. If productivity 
occured autonomoulsy and this gave rise to wage changes, we 
might expect less variation in the rates of change than we 
observe. Furthermore, we find that wages increased somewhat 
more than productivity throughout the period (note that the 
wage coefficient is less than 1). Finally, the public statements 
of union leaders suggest that they would be unwilling to accept 
a wage cut if productivity fell from the use of more labour 
intensive production methods. This suggests that there may 
well be some minimum level of wage increase which would be 
- 1 6 -
acceptable. If this is the case, expectations of rising 
wages will cause employers to increase labour productivity 
and subsequently grant corresponding wage increases. If this 
is the case, we could once again argue that wage increases, 
or expectation of wage increases is the independent variable 
which causes productivity increases. To recapitulate, we 
cannot obsolutely reject the notion that the direction of 
causation runs from productivity to wages, but we find it much 
less plausible than the alternative. 
Now let's look at the regression results for Asian and 
European employees. In neither case does the regression 
provide near the degree of explanation that it does for African 
workers. This ^ probably reflects the greater difficulty of 
substitution/other factors for skilled and managerial inputs thai." 
for unskilled or semi-skilled manpower. 
Looking at the scatter diagram, Figure 2, we see that 
Asian employees experienced a mch narrower range of wage 
changes than did Africans and that there is a great deal of 
variability in the average productivity changes. We would 
expect that this reflects in large part Asian exodus and Africa-
nization of many skilled jobs previously held by Asians. These 
factors will cause the measured average productivity of Asian 
workers to increase with relatively little effect on the 
average wage of those remaining in employment. The relatively 
high value of the constant term of equation (2) partially 
confirms this notion (note, however, that in real terms this 
suggests about a 1 per cent annual increase in average 
productivity) as does the insignificant value of the coefficient. 
Although this equation is consistent with the hypothesis that it 
is less possible to substitute other factors for skilled than 
for unskilled labour, we are loath to draw any strong conclusions 
from this regression because of the special factors affecting 
Asian employment during the period. 
Finally, equation (3) suggests a significant unit 
elasticity relationship between wage and productivity of 
European employees but provides a rather weak degree of expla-
nation. Again, Africanization of posts previously held by 
Europeans probably explains the weakness of the relationship. 
We would also be inclined to accept the argument that wages 
are a reflection more than a cause of the observed productivity 
of European personnel. Most management and high-level technical 
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Although we have no direct evidence at the lament, it 
seems likely that much of the productivity increase has arisen 
from improved organization and managerial practices. Evidence 
is abundant that scope for such improvement is considerable 
in most industries in most countries.^/ However, if such 
improvements could be made costlessly, there is no particular 
reason to expect them to be directly related to wages. If, 
however, organizational resources are limited, then they will 
be directed to areas in which the cost savings will be greatest. 
As wages rise, improved efficiency in the use of labour will 
become more and more important to the survival or profitability 
of a firm and we would expect considerable improvements in 
labour usage. Even more important, we think, is the substitution 
of supervision and organization of labour in response to higher 
wage s. 
We believe that the most important source of productivity 
increase has arisen from training workers and upgrading skills. 
Although we have no systematic data at the moment to substantiate 
this claim, observations of many experienced observers confirm 
the statement. It seems eminently reasonable from the stand-
point of firms that they will devote resources to training 
workers if they expect that wages will be rising anyway and 
therefore if they are to remain competitive they will have to 
upgrade skills so that the v/orkers will be worth the higher 
wages in the future. Of course, there is the problem of firms 
not wanting to train individuals who can be "poached" by firms 
not bearing the training costs, yet there is evidence of subs-
tantial amount of training being undertaken by firms. Some of 
the skills are firm-specific, other firmshave been responsive 
to governmental pressure to undertake training. Furthermore 
the expanded outpouring of individuals from the educational 
system and trade schools have contributed to the upgrading 
of skills employed. 
Again, it is interesting to note that Reynolds attributes 
most of the increase in productivity in Puerto Rico to organi-
zation, management, ana training. He finds little evidence 
for capital deepening. 
^See H. Leibenstein, "Allocative Efficiency v. !X-Efficiency," 
A.E.R., L7I (June, 1966). 
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These findings are also consistent with the largely 
qualitative evidence available for productivity change in Uganda 
industry.-^/ We hope, however, to be able to obtain much more 
satisfactory evidence about the sources of productivity change 
from detailed cross-sectional data on Kenyan industry. 
It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that there 
has been considerable substitution of capital, organization, 
management, and skills for unskilled labour in Kenya. This 
substitution has been induced primarily by rapidly rising levels 
of real wages. Consequently, we believe that our results have 
important implications for the formulation of economic policies 
designed to stimulate a higher rate of labour absorption in Kenya. 
A. Baryaruha, Factors Affecting Industrial Employment; A Study 
of Ugandan Experience 1954 to 1964 (Nairobi; Oxford University 
Press, E.A.I.S.E.R. Occasional Paper No. 1, 1967). 
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Policy Implications 
What are the policy implications of our findings? The 
most obvious implication is that wage movements, especially 
for the unskilled African labourers, d£ play a significant 
role in influencing entrepreneurial employment decisions. Even 
through there appears to be a variety of sources through which 
accelerated rates of labour productivity growth are achieved, 
the ultimate incentive factor causing entrepreneurs to lower 
the relative labour component of their production processes is, 
we would argue, the existence and anticipation of secularly 
rising urban real wages. It follows, therefore, that in the 
absence of a concentrated effort to "hold the 3Lne" an industrial 
wage rates, potential increases in employment opportunities 
arising from programmes of accelerated industrial growth will 
be largely negated by the intentional substitution of scarce 
capital, training and managerial organizational inputs for the 
ever more expensive, although relatively abundant, unskilled 
manpower. 
So far we have confined out discussion exclusively to 
an analysis of the impact of wages on urban employment. However, 
as we have argued elsewhere, the level and rate of increase 
of industrial unskilled wage rates can have an equally, if not 
greater, impact on the level and rate of increase in urban 
unemployment.^/ There it is argued that in spite of the obvious 
existence of limited urban employment opportunities, the lure 
of an ever increasing urban-rural expected wage differential 
will continue to act as a magnet atrracting unskilled rural 
workers away from the farm in the expectation, however slight, 
of securing one of these high paying, prestigious urban jobs. 
Consequently, a secularly rising urban real wage rate in obvious 
excess of social costs and in spite of widespread urban unemploy-
ment exerts a dual debilitating influence in the urban labour 
market. Not only does it restrain the expansion of new employment 
opportunities but it also indirectly contributes to a worsening 
of the already serious problem of urban unemployment through 
inducing additional migration to urban areas. 
One final implication of our analysis seems to be the 
following; if, as out findings suggest, higher rates of wage 
increases tend to be offset, albeit only partially, by higher 
J.R. Harris and M.P. Todaro, "Urban Unemployment in East Africa: 
An Econooic Analysis of Policy Alternatives," East African 
Economic Review, Vol. 4, No.2, Dec. 1968. 
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rates of labour productivity growth, then it follows that if 
real wages are stabilized, labour productivity growth will 
also tend to level o f f M Consequently, our findings seem to 
underline a fundamental, but often overlooked, social, political 
and economic policy choice with regard to wage policy, employment, 
and unemployment in Kenya. The choice is this: do we want to 
have a highly mechanized urban industrial economy with a small, 
elite, highly skilled, highly productive labour force with 
substantial and ever worsening urban unemployment, or, shall we 
opt for a less mechanized, more labour intensive industrial 
economy with a less skilled, less individually productive urban 
labour force but one with more widespread human participation 
and lower levels of urban unemployment. On strictly economic 
grounds, it is not at all clear as to which alternative is most 
2/ 
desirable in terms of some optimum path of economic development.— 
Only further detailed empirical study can provide an answer to the 
question. However, in terms of the socio-economic priorities 
of the Kenya government as revealed in Sessional P a p e r No. 1 0 On 
"African Socialism", there seems to be little doubt that economic 
policy framers in Kenya place highest priority on the goal of 
maximum labour participation in the economy with an egalitarian 
distribution of income. If such a national priority results in 
lower overall rates of industrial growth and even perhaps in 
somewhat higher monetary costs of production (we doubt strongly, 
however, that this would be the case), it does not follow that 
the social costs of pursuing the policy of maximum labour 
absorption will be any greater than the pursuit of maximum growth. 
In fact, we believe that they would be considerably lower given 
either a short or a long run time horizen. 
—/it does not follow, however,that total factor productivity 
the more relevant criterion for efficient production, will 
necessarily be lower, given lower unit labour costs. 
2/ 
^ Of course in the long run Kenya will have to have a high paid high 
skilled labour force if its development programs are successful. 
That is the goal, and, indeed, practically the definition of 
economic development. The question here, however, is how an 
efficient and a socially desirable path to reach that goal 
can be achieved. 
